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VideoWe test the hypothesis that smiles perceived as honest serve as a signal that has evolved to induce cooperation in
situations requiringmutual trust. Potential trustees (84 participants fromToulouse, France)made two video clips
averaging around 15 seconds for viewing by potential senders before the latter decided whether to ‘send’ or
‘keep’ a lower stake (4 euros) or higher stake (8 euros). Senders (198 participants from Lyon, France)made trust
decisions with respect to the recorded clips. If money was sent to the trustee, stakes were tripled and trustees
could decide to keep all, two thirds or one half of the tripled stakes. Clips were further rated concerning the
genuineness of the displayed smiles. We observe that smiles rated as more genuine strongly predict judgments
about the trustworthiness of trustees, andwillingness to send themmoney.We observe a relation between costs
and beneﬁts: smiles from trustees playing for higher stakes are rated as signiﬁcantly more genuine. Finally, we
showthat those rated as smiling genuinely returnmoremoneyonaverage to senders.An increaseof one standard
deviation in ratingof smile genuineness is associatedwith anunconditional expectedgain of about onedollar and
thirty cents to senders in the two trials of the experiment. Potential gains for senders could be signiﬁcantly
increased from taking smiles rated as genuine into account.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).1. Introduction
Smiling is a form of behavior that is found in all human societies
and plays a central part in human communication (Darwin, 1872;
Ekman, 1982; Niedenthal, Mermillod, Maringer, & Hess, 2010). There
is scientiﬁc consensus that viewers perceive smiles as varying in their
degree of "genuineness" or "convincingness". Since the work of
Duchenne de Boulogne (1862) and Darwin (1872) many researchers
have attempted to identify objective measures of honest smiles,
concluding that genuine smiles are characterized by use of the
orbicularis oculi (the muscle surrounding the eyes) in combination
with the zygomatic major (raising the corners of the mouth);
symmetry is also an important characteristic. More recent research
focuses on the importance of temporal dynamics such as smile onset,
apex, and offset durations (Krumhuber et al., 2007). Smiles perceived
as genuine are not under straightforward voluntary control. Some
individuals can make them more often and more easily than others,
and all individuals ﬁnd them easier to make when in certain affective
states. Such states include a relaxed mood in general, and feeling well
disposed to a communication partner in particular. Smiles also inducet).
c. This is an open access article undeboth conscious and unconscious mimicry (Niedenthal et al., 2010).
Although individuals can smile when alone, smiling behavior seems to
be a form of communication. But if so, what is it communicating, and
why have we evolved a form of communication behavior that is under
such imperfect conscious control?
A large literature exists in affective sciences concerning the
identiﬁcation of honest smiles (see for example Ekman, 2005;
Ekman & Friesen, 1982) through coding of facial activity. Naive
untrained observers correlate in their evaluations with categoriza-
tions by experts, but are far from reaching the same accuracy as
experts. Since the effect of a signal depends on the perception of this
signal by the receiver, we will in this paper focus on smiles that are
subjectively ‘perceived’ as being genuine. We test the hypothesis that
smiles perceived as genuine are an honest signal of cooperation
opportunities for situations requiring mutual trust. We observe trust
and trustworthiness behavior in a two person trust game where
senders observed short video clips of trustees before taking their
decisions. These video clips were further rated by participating
senders in the study along a number of dimensions, among which the
genuineness of the trustee's smile. We hypothesize that:
H1. Senders will be more willing to trust those trustees who are
able to produce smiles rated on average as genuine.r the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).
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(as rated by all senders).
H3. On average, trusting those who produce smiles rated on
average as more genuine, will lead to higher earnings for senders.
H1 is important in explaining why human beings should have
evolved the habit of communicating in this way; there would be no
point unless it succeeded in inﬂuencing the behavior of others. H2
is important in distinguishing the idea that smiles rated as genuine
are an honest signal of some cooperation opportunity from two
alternative views: ﬁrst, that it is a form of costless communication that
solves pure coordination problems (like "cheap talk"), and second,
that it is not communication at all but merely an outward sign of an
inner emotional state. H3 is important to explain why human beings
should also have evolved the tendency to be inﬂuenced by the smiles
of others. The evolutionary process bywhich smiling developed surely
involved a good deal of repeated interaction between individuals
who knew each other well, but like many other human adaptations,
smiling may have been used opportunistically for interactions with
strangers as these became more frequent in later history.
There exists some corroborating evidence for H1 and H3 in the
literature. Schug, Matsumoto, Horita, Yamagishi, and Bonnet (2010)
demonstrate that individuals who display relatively cooperative
tendencies as proposers in an ultimatum game are more emotionally
expressive in the face of unfair treatment by others than those who
do not, including in the tendency to emit Duchenne as opposed to
non-Duchenne smiles,which is consistentwithH3.However, there is no
test of any association between their emission of Duchenne smiles and
their gestures of cooperation, and the sample is small (20 participants).
Mehu, Grammer, and Dunbar (2007) suggest that human smiles are
more prevalent in situations that involve sharing or exploitation of
resources. Byﬁlming sixty pairs of friends during a neutral and a sharing
decision they observe that signiﬁcantly more Duchenne smiles are
produced during sharing situations, thus situations requiring sharing
elicit smiles and laughter (Mehu & Dunbar, 2008).
Whether trustworthy partners can be detected from still pictures is
controversial and might depend on the moment when the picture was
taken (Verplaetse, Vanneste, & Braeckman, 2007; Yamagishi, Tanida,
Mashima, Shimoma, & Kanazawa, 2003) and whether trust evaluations
are explicit or basedon actions (DeNeys,Hopfensitz, &Bonnefon, 2013).
Efferson andVogt (2013) report that viewing still pictures ofmen's faces
does not lead to improved accuracy in predictions of trustworthiness.
Dynamic pictures might in this respect be better (Brown, Palameta, &
Moore, 2003). However Vogt, Efferson, and Fehr (2013) used short
video clips of subjects in a variety of interactional settings thatwere not
explicitly directed at a partner; other experimental subjects were not
able to use these clips to infer trustworthiness.
H1 is the only one of the three hypotheses that has been tested
directly, and has received signiﬁcant support (Johnston, Miles, &
Macrae, 2010; Scharlemann, Eckel, Kacelnik, & Wilson, 2001).
Scharlemann et al. (2001) use still pictures and observe that
participants trust more when seeing a smiling image of their partner.
Johnston et al. (2010) use video clips and observe more trust in
response to enjoyment smiles. In contrast to our study they test
cooperation in a prisoners' dilemma (where non-cooperation is a
dominant strategy, unlike in the trust game, where non-cooperation is
the unique subgame perfect equilibrium strategy but is not a
dominant strategy). They do so on the basis of comparison of only
two clips, and cannot control for other differences between clips. Mehu,
Little, andDunbar (2007)assesswhat characteristics are associatedwith
honest smiles by rating ﬁfty faces across ten attributes. It turns out that
Duchenne smiles play a signiﬁcant role in the assessment of generosity
and extraversion.
The phylogeny of smiling further suggests that it leads observers to
behave less aggressively. The "horizontal silent-bared teeth" display(involving strong horizontal, as well as vertical, lip retraction; teeth
and gums are exposed, but the mouth itself is closed) in non-human
primates can be regarded as an analogue of our human smiling.
It is assumed to have an appeasing or re-assuring function; its sender
is usually the inferior partner; it may also be a signal in a process of
negotiation between two individuals (Preuschoft & van Hooff, 1997).
This suggests that in humans, smiling could serve as a kind of mimicry
of submission, used by dominant partners to assure others that they
will not abuse the opportunities for betrayal of the trust of others.
More generally faces seem to be consistently rated concerning
their trustworthiness, which is mirrored by actions. van ‘t Wout and
Sanfey (2008) observe that judgments of facial trustworthiness are
related to sending money in a trust game. Trustworthiness ratings are
also a signiﬁcant predictor of howmuchmoney these players received
in one-shot trust game, a ﬁnding replicated for repeated trust games
(Chang, Doll, van 't Wout, Frank, & Sanfey, 2010).
Even though our investigation of perceived honesty of smiles as an
honest signaling device is novel, a large number of studies in
economics and psychology have in recent years investigated the
importance of emotions in games. Inspired by results from affective
sciences that emotions are not just some random noise but an
essential part of the decision making mechanism (Damasio, 1994),
theoretical and experimental work has investigated the effect of
different emotions and other visceral factors on decision making
(Elster, 1998; Frijda, Manstead, & Fischer, 2004; Kahneman, 2003;
Ketelaar, 2006; Loewenstein, 2000) and the information conveyed by
emotional display (Parkinson, 2005). Smiles are an expression of
experienced happiness and might be used as a coordination device
(Manzini, Sadrieh, & Vriend, 2009), but might also be an important
component in social exchange (Owren & Bachorowski, 2001).
Signaling has been extensively studied both in economics since
Veblen (1899) and Spence (1974), and independently in biology since
Zahavi (1975). Signals have been deﬁned as “an act or structure
that alters the behavior of another organism, which evolved because
of that effect, and which is effective because the receiver's response
has also evolved” (Maynard Smith & Harper, 2003). A costly signal
(or handicap) further imposes a cost on its bearer (a pecuniary or
non-pecuniary effort cost in economics, a ﬁtness cost in biology) by
which reliability is ensured. Speciﬁcally it indicates the presence of
some advantageous hidden trait because the signal is more difﬁcult to
send for those individuals who do not possess the trait than for those
who do (Grafen, 1990). For an overview of different deﬁnitions,
speciﬁcally concerning the type and size of costs and the type of
information conveyed, see Maynard Smith and Harper (2003). We
conjecture that the hidden trait associated with smiles perceived as
honest could be an intrinsic characteristic of the smiler (such as her
degree of altruism or tendency to display reciprocity as in Gintis,
Bowles, Boyd, & Fehr, 2003), a medium-term state (such as good
mood) or a characteristic of the situation in which the smiler ﬁnds
herself (such as the size of the pie she is proposing to share). It could
also be a combination of any of these.
To test our hypotheses we observe non-verbal behavior in an
economic experiment involving trust. In a trust game ﬁrst movers
(called "senders") each decide whether to send a sum of money to a
second player, called a trustee. If they do so the sum is tripled, and the
trustee may divide this sum between himself and the sender. In our
experiment, trustees made short video clips to be shown to senders
before the latter took their decision. Participants knew that this was
their only mean to convince their partner to trust them.
To detect whether an interaction partner can be trusted we can
normally rely on third party information regarding the target
individual's reputation (Sommerfeld, Krambeck, & Milinski, 2008),
or use visual signals concerning the individual's character (Frank,
1988). Indeed it has been observed that players in trust games are
willing to spend money relying on visual information of their partner
(Eckel & Petrie, 2008). The kind of visual information used is however
Trustees (84 participants, Toulouse, France)
4 weeks later
Senders (198 participants, Lyon, France)
visualization of 21/14 clips
trust decision (yes/no) for each clip
mix of clip1 and clip2
Series 1: Series  2:
decision stage 1: rating stage 1:
second visualization 
of clips
ratings for each clip
visualization of 21/14 clips
trust decision (yes/no) for each clip
mix of clip1 and clip2
second 
visualization of clips
ratings for each clip
decision stage 2: rating stage 2: questionnaire
and
payout
time
time
Series 1: Series  2:
One clip (partner) randomly 
selected for payout
One clip (partner) randomly 
selected for payout
questionnaire test recording recording clip 1 recording clip 2return decision:
game 1
payoutreturn decision:
game 2
Fig. 1. Timeline of experimental sessions for senders and trustees. Note: faces are blurred in the ﬁgure to preserve subject anonymity in publication; actual clips were not blurred.
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that respect (Cohn & Schmidt, 2004).
Altruism and cheater detection in social dilemmas have received
considerable attention in economics and biology (Cosmides & Tooby,
1992; Gintis, Smith, & Bowles, 2001). It is evident that signals that can
be used to identify altruists might quickly be imitated by non-altruists
and would thus no longer be reliable (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2005). One
suggestion is that altruism as such can serve as a reliable signal of
trustworthiness (Gintis et al., 2001; Lotem, Fishman, & Stone, 2003;
Smith & Bliege Bird, 2000). However, in many situations, behavior
of the interaction partner cannot be observed. In order to detect
trustworthy partners reliably in one-shot interactions, it is therefore
necessary to base decisions on verbal or non-verbal signals sent by
the partner.2. Experimental methods and data description
2.1. Methods
We use a simpliﬁed version of the original trust game, proposing
senders a binary choice of trust or no trust and trustees three different
return options (see Hopfensitz & Reuben, 2009). Sessions for trusteesTable 1
Correlation between ratings of clips.
Genuineness Smiles
amount
Trustworthy Attractive Intelligent
Smiles amount 0.24a
Trustworthy 0.64a 0.17a
Attractive 0.25a 0.29a 0.28a
Intelligent 0.25a 0.16a 0.37a 0.32a
Self-conﬁdent −0.01 0.36a 0 0.27a 0.25a
a Correlation is signiﬁcant at the 1% level.were conducted ﬁrst, to allow them to record their video messages.
Their actions were obtained at the same time using the strategy
method (in other words, they reported what they would return
to senders in case the sender decided to trust them). Decisions
for senders and trustees were incentivized, and earnings were
determined according to their partners' decisions. Therefore trustees
were not rewarded until after senders had made their respective
trust decisions.
Video messages were produced by eighty-four volunteers aged
between 18 and 35 years recruited from the general population in
Toulouse, France. We told trustees that they would face two different
but unknown partners who might be persuaded to send them a sum
that would be tripled if they did so. For the ﬁrst partner, trustees
recorded their videomessage before being informed about the precise
payoffs and thus before taking their decision, while for the second
they recorded their message after taking their return decision. These
two treatments were always presented in the same order, due to the
impossibility of having participants ﬁrst play a game where they are
informed about payoffs and then a game where they do not know
about the different payoff options, as the options are constant over the
two games. The trustee had to choose between returning: nothing,
the sender's original stake or 1.5 times the sender's original stake
(thus half the total amount). Trustees were randomly split into twoTable 2
Summary statistics of participants.
Senders Trustees
Number of participants: 198 84
Percentage male 50% 45%
Percentage student 92% 46%
Mean age 21.58 (4.37) 24.86 (4.73)
Percentage of trust choices 38%
Note: standard deviations in parenthesis.
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4 euros (approx. $5) per game (thus trustees would have to decide
about the split of 12 euros, approximately $15 , in case of a trust
decision), and senders' stakes in the higher stake treatment were
8 euros (approx. $10) per game (thus trustees would have to decide
about the split of 24 euros, approximately $30, in case of a trust
decision). Average earnings for trustees were 2.7 euros per game in
the lower and 6.9 euros per game in the higher stake treatment (there
were two games per experimental session).
Video clips were made on a professional TV platform located on
the campus of the Toulouse School of Economics, and a practice clip
helped participants become familiar with the environment (for
detailed methods see the online appendix). A total of 168 video
clips was obtained, two for each trustee. Verbal messages during clips
were standardized by giving a predetermined sentence to trustees
that had to be memorized. The sentence (in French) was: “Hello, I am
[name], I am [age] years old. I have been living in Toulouse since [year].
I am [occupation]. I am very happy that you have accepted to
participate in this game with me. I do hope that you will trust me and
that you will play with me.” To make the message natural for trustees
it included their name, age and occupation, and trustees were
reassured that the precise wording did not matter. Participants
were not allowed to view their recorded clips, and only in exceptional
cases (outside noise, complete black-out of text) allowed to re-record
their clip. Video clips lasted around ﬁfteen seconds on average, with
the fastest at around ten and the slowest at around twenty seconds.
Senders' behavior and evaluation of video clips were obtained in a
different experimental laboratory to minimize the risk that senders
might recognize trustees. A total of 198 student participants were
recruited at the University of Lyon; 84 senders participated in a ﬁrst
wave and 114 in a second. The difference between the two waves was
that participants in the ﬁrst wave were matched with trustees and
their decisions determined trustees' payoffs, as trustees had previ-
ously been informed. Observations from the ﬁrst wave therefore
concern games where sender and trustee faced the same stake size.
We implemented a second wave, in which new participants again
made trust decisions with respect to the same video clips and were
paid according to trustees' initial decision. In the second wave,
senders were informed only that trustees might return nothing, their
initial endowment or 1.5 times their endowment. Note that since
trustees had by this time already been paid, decisions of senders in
this second wave did not inﬂuence trustees' earnings. Senders in the
second wave were endowed with initial stakes of 4 euros (as in the
lower stake treatment), with 8 euros (i.e. as in the higher stake
treatment), or with a new extra-high treatment of 12 euros.
In the ﬁrst and second waves respectively, each sender viewed a
total of 42 (respectively 28) clips in two series of 21 (resp. 14).
Senders were presented twice with each series. When ﬁrst seeing
each clip senders were asked to decide whether to send money to the
trustee. They were then again presented the same series of clips andTable 3
General characteristics of trustees by treatment.
Lower stakes
treatment
(N = 42)
Higher stakes
treatment
(N = 42)
Difference
Age 24.7 25.0 −0.24
Men 45.2% 45.2% 0.00
Single (not in a relationship) 16.7% 19.0% −2.40
African ethnicity 7.1% 7.1% 0.00
Facial (lips, eyebrows) piercing 9.5% 0.0% 9.6⁎
Wearing glasses 4.8% 14.3% −9.50
Male participants with beard 9.5% 14.3% −4.80
Female participants with cleavage exposed 11.9% 7.1% 4.80
⁎ Mean difference is statistically different from 0 at 5% conﬁdence level; differences
between means are tested using the Wilcoxon rank sum statistic.asked to rank the trustee on an 8-point scale along a number of
dimensions including howmuch they smiled, how genuine were their
smiles, their attractiveness, their trustworthiness, their intelligence
and their self-conﬁdence. To determine payouts, senders were
matched at random with two trustees (one from each series) and
received payoffs based on the actual decisions of these partners. To
ensure anonymity for trustees it was not revealed which of the clips
viewed had been selected to determine senders' payoffs. From the
ﬁrst wave a total of 21 decisions and ratings concerning each of the
168 clips was obtained. From the second wave an average of 19
decisions and ratings for each clip was obtained. Clips in our dataset
have an average of 40 ratings each, with a minimum of 38 and a
maximum of 45. Fig. 1 summarizes the timeline of choices made by
senders and trustees.
Note that during the ﬁrst wave senders and trustees faced
the same stake size (i.e. initial stakes available to senders were either
4 or 8 euros). To disentangle the direct effect of stake size on senders
(more money at stake for sender) from the indirect effects (more
money as stake for trustee), half of a sender's video messages during
the second wave came from trustees in the higher stake treatment
and half came from the lower stake treatment.
This set-up enabled us to investigate separately the effect of stake
size on trustee clip characteristics and on sender behavior. All results
reported use the pooled data from the two waves of the experiment.
A dummy variable distinguishing the twowaves was never signiﬁcant
in any speciﬁcation, indicating that the two waves were conducted
under indistinguishable conditions.
2.2. Descriptive statistics
Characteristics of the clips are based on ratings by senders, who
would be thereby motivated to observe each clip carefully and would
be less likely to be inﬂuenced by irrelevant factors in their evaluations.
For each clip the large number of ratings avoids idiosyncratic reactions
of individual raters. In our analyses below we use the average rating
by all senders to predict any individual sender's behavior in order to
avoid possible reverse causality whereby senders might seek to
“justify” their decisions to send money by rating clips accordingly.
This averaging method also avoids biases arising from possible
systematic differences in ratings by individual senders, some of whom
may be systematically more “positive” than others. As a robustness
check we standardized the individual ratings by the mean and the
variance of the rater before computing the average for each trustee, and
similar qualitative results (not reported here) were obtained.
Table 1 presents a correlation table between the six characteristics
rated for each clip.Weobserve a strong correlationbetween clips rated as
showing genuine smiles and ratings of trustworthiness, attractiveness
and intelligence. Themean rating concerning the intensity of smiles was
4.85 (median 4.87; st. dev. 0.542) and of the genuineness of smiles was
4.95 (median 4.96; st. dev. 0.341).
To identify characteristics of clips receiving high ratings concern-
ing smile genuineness, facial movements in clips were automatically
analyzed with the commercial facial analysis tool FaceReader 5
(Bijlstra & Dotsch, 2011). We focus here on the action units related to
genuine smiles, speciﬁcally the percentage of the clips duration
showing activation of the zygomaticus major (AU12); and combina-
tions with the orbicularis oculi (AU12 + AU6). FaceReaders' classiﬁ-
cation of AU6 and AU12 has been validated on the Amsterdam
Dynamic Facial Expression Set and reaches accuracy of 88 and 82
percent, respectively (Den Uyl, 2013). Since raters could record their
ratings at any time during the viewing of the clip, we consider the ﬁrst
two-second interval of each clip and the ﬁrst four-second interval of
each clip (i.e. the ﬁrst 50 and 100 frames, respectively). In these
intervals 57% and 59%, respectively, of clips show an activation of
either AU6 or AU12. We observe a signiﬁcant rank correlation
between the combined activation of AU12 and AU6 and ratings of
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Fig. 2. Differences in (a) ratings of trustees and (b) trust and trustworthiness by treatment (one tailed p-values for mean comparison clustered by trustee are reported).
12 S. Centorrino et al. / Evolution and Human Behavior 36 (2015) 8–16smile genuineness (Kendalls' tau: 2 seconds: 0.08, p = 0.041; 4 seconds:
0.07, p = 0.099) and a non-signiﬁcant rank correlation with lip corner
pulls (Kendalls' tau: AU12: 2 seconds: 0.075, p = 0.117; 4 seconds:
0.066, p = 0.178). Using a rank measure of correlation is required
because of the substantial number of zeros in the activation unit data.
Characteristics of our participants for each group of players
are summarized in Table 2. The ﬁrst column reports the means
and standard deviations for the senders. This subsample is exactly
gender-balanced, the average age is 22 years, and 92% are currently
students. For a given sender, the percentage of decisions for which she
decided to sendmoney ranges from 0 to 100%. Of the 198 participants,
3 participants decided to sendmoney to every partner, and 20 decided
never to send money. On average, senders decided to cooperate
with 38% of their partners. Column (2) concerns the trustees, who
are 25 years old on average. The sample of trustees comes from a
less homogeneous population than the senders since only 46% are
students. The sample of trustees is fairly balancedwith 55% of women.
As described above, the trustees recorded two video clips and
made a sharing decision for each clip. The distribution of choices in
these two decisions is not statistically different. In the ﬁrst decision,
55% of the participants decided to share equally the amount received
(i.e. the stake multiplied by 3), 31% decided to send back the original
stake to the sender and keep 2/3 of the total pie, and the remaining
14% decided to return nothing. In the second decision, the distribution
suggests a slight shift from equal sharing to sending nothing (49%
share equally; 32% return original stakes and 19% return nothing), but
this is not statistically signiﬁcant. Overall, trustees' decisions had the
result that the unconditional expected gain to senders from sending
money as opposed to keeping it was a little above zero (those in the
lower stake treatment could expect to make 4.6 euros instead of 4;those in the higher stake treatment could make 8.4 euros instead of 8,
while those in the extra-high treatment could make 13.1 euros
instead of 12). This therefore provides an excellent environment in
which to test how smile characteristics inﬂuence the conditional
expected gain.
We further observe that senders' average ratings were not
signiﬁcantly differentwhether theywatched the ﬁrst or the second clip.
Table 3 summarizes other observable characteristics for trustees in
the lower and higher stake treatments. Only the probability of having
a facial piercing differs signiﬁcantly from one treatment group to
another, suggesting that the treatment can be considered as random.
3. Results
Fig. 2 shows a comparison of lower and higher stake treatments of
trustees in terms of the average ratings by senders of the genuineness
of their smiles, their average trustworthiness rating, the proportion of
senders who decided to send money, and the proportion of trustees
who chose to return a positive amount of money.
Fig. 2 indicates that trustees under the higher stake treatment are
perceived as having more genuine smiles and as being more
trustworthy, and are associated with a higher percentage of senders
sending money, although a smaller percentage of trustees under the
higher stake treatment actually return any money to the senders. One
could think that the positive correlation of the higher stake treatment
with perceived smile genuineness and with selﬁsh behavior would
imply that smiles perceived as genuine are positively correlated
with selﬁsh behavior. However, Fig. 3 indicates that this is not so.
The explanation is that those in the higher stakes group who
succeeded in making smiles perceived as genuine were not a
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Fig. 3. Differences in (a) ratings of trustees and (b) trust and trustworthiness by smile quality (one tailed p-values for mean comparison clustered by trustee are reported).
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not succeed.
In Fig. 3 clips are divided into those whose smiles were given
average ratings above 5 (46% of the clips) and the rest. As already
observed from the correlations, clips with smiles perceived as genuine
were given higher ratings for trustworthiness, attractiveness and
intelligence, and were associated with a higher willingness to send
money, but were also associated with a slightly higher willingness to
return at least some money to senders. The latter is not statistically
signiﬁcant, but the association is not negative as Fig. 2 might
have led us to expect. Similarly we observe no signiﬁcant rank
correlation between the decision by trustees and the concurrent
activation of action units 06 and 12 during the clip (Kendall's tau:
0.054 p = 0.191). So overall it appears that the higher stake
treatment created both a higher incentive to smile in a way perceived
as genuine, and a higher incentive to be selﬁsh instead of returning
money to the sender, but that those in the high treatment who
succeeded in creating smiles perceived as genuineweremore likely to
return the money than those who did not. In Figs. 2 and 3, most of the
mean comparisons are signiﬁcant at or near 5% levels, except for the
unselﬁshness comparison in Fig. 3 which is insigniﬁcant; the majority
(7 out of 9) are signiﬁcant at well under 1%. Standard errors are
clustered by trustee to take account of the correlation between the
characteristics of the two clips made by each trustee.
We now turn to multivariate regression analysis. We consider our
three hypotheses in turn. In all cases, in order to avoid possible
"justiﬁcation effects" in which users' ratings are inﬂuenced by the
decisions to send money they have already taken, we use as measuresof smile quality, trustworthiness and attractiveness the average rating
of each clip across all viewers, rather than the rating given by the
individuals themselves; this requires, however, that standard errors
be calculated clustering by clip.
Table 4 reports the tests of our ﬁrst two hypotheses. Equation A
tests hypothesis H2, that higher stake trust games will provoke more
smiles rated as genuine. The treatment effect is signiﬁcant at under
2%: 0.12 points, which is about 36% of one standard deviation of the
distribution of mean ratings by clip.
Other notable features of equation A are that smiles rated as
genuine are associated with trustees who are rated as more
intelligent, and also with older trustees. Trustees with beards are
rated as having less genuine smiles, and women with part of their
cleavage exposed are rated as having signiﬁcantly more genuine
smiles (it is not clearwhether the causalmechanism is via thepsychology
of the smiler or of the viewer). There is neither a signiﬁcant effect of
gender for either the senderor the trustee, norofperceivedattractiveness
of the trustee, and no effect of whether the clip is ﬁlmed before or
after the decision to return themoney has beenmade. These coefﬁcients
(like those of other controls) are not reported, though the full
speciﬁcation is available from the authors.
Equations B and C test hypothesis H1, that senders will be more
willing to trust those trustees who are able to produce smiles rated as
genuine. First, equation B considers whether smiles rated as genuine
are associated with judgments of greater trustworthiness. There is a
massively signiﬁcant correlation (t-ratio of over 8); a one-point deviation
increase in genuineness rating of the smile is associated with slightly
more than a half point increase in perceived trustworthiness. Perceived
Table 4
Tests of hypotheses.
Equation A Equation B Equation C
Dependent variable: Mean genuineness rating of smile (scale 1–8) Mean trustworthiness rating (scale 1–8) Decision to send money (send = 1)
Independent variables (characteristics of trustee):
Trustee in higher stakes treatment 0.165*** (0.002) 0.079** (0.051) −0.011 (0.800)
Mean genuineness rating of smile 0.542*** (0.000) 0.219*** (0.000)
Mean perceived amount of smiles 0.182*** (0.000) 0.013 (0.747) 0.035 (0.297)
Mean intelligence rating 0.190** (0.048) 0.310*** (0.000) 0.154** (0.012)
Age of trustee 0.012** (0.040) 0.007 (0.133) 0.005 (0.142)
Male participant with beard −0.204** (0.020) −0.006 (0.927) −0.050 (0.404)
Female participant with cleavage exposed 0.187** (0.046) −0.008 (0.929) 0.067 (0.188)
Note: p-values in parentheses, one-tailed values reported for high treatment and smile quality, two-tailed values for other variables. Standard errors clustered by clip, * = signiﬁcant
at 10%, ** = signiﬁcant at 5%, *** = signiﬁcant at 1%. Equations A, B and D are estimated by ordinary least squares, equation C is a probit estimated by maximum likelihood. Other
controls include gender of sender and trustee, perceived attractiveness, video sequence, sender's treatment, dummy variables for the trustee being of African ethnicity, having visible
facial piercing and wearing glasses in equations A, in addition to perceived self-conﬁdence, in equation B. Equation C adds to the previous set of controls a dummy variable for
senders self-reported unselﬁsh behavior from the general social survey, income, age of sender and score on a simple intelligence test. The estimated coefﬁcients for the other controls
not reported, available from authors on request. Number of observations = 6,720. Variables smile quality, intelligence and trustworthiness are means by clip.
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perceived trustworthiness, and there is a signiﬁcant effect of the higher
stake treatment independently of perceived smile genuineness, suggest-
ing that trustees are putting effort into other dimensions of non-verbal
communication as well. Equation C examines whether smiles rated
as genuine lead to an increased probability of sending money to the
trustees. Once again there is a massively signiﬁcant association: a one
point increase in perceived smile genuineness leads to a 21% increase in
theprobability of sending themoney,which is equivalent to a7% increase
per standard deviation of the rating of smile genuineness. Perceived
intelligence is again a very important factor in the decision.
Table 5 reports two tests of hypothesis H3, that on average,
trusting those that produce smiles rated as more genuine will lead to
higher earnings for senders.We calculate for each sender the potential
gain from sending money, which is deﬁned for those who sent money
to trustees as their actual gain, and is deﬁned for those who did not
send money as the amount of money they would have gained if they
had sent it. In equation D we test the hypothesis that the potential
gain is unconditionally associated with smiles rated as more genuine.
We therefore regress the potential gain on the mean genuineness
rating of the smiles, and on nothing else. Mean ratings of smile
genuineness are signiﬁcant at slightly under 7%, and the magnitude of
the effect is economically signiﬁcant too (a gain of 1.5 euros for each
point on the scale). To put this in perspective, an increase of one
standard deviation in rating of smile genuineness is associated
with an unconditional expected gain of about 0.5 euros per trial or
1 euro for the whole experiment (equivalent to around one dollar and
thirty cents).
The second variant of the hypothesis we test in equation E is that,
conditional on what the sender otherwise knows, she could
signiﬁcantly improve her potential gain by accounting for smilesTable 5
Do ratings of smile genuineness predict potential gains from sending money?
Equation D Equation E
Dependent variable: Unconditional potential
gain (euros) from
sending money
Potential gain
conditional on
sender's knowledge
Independent variables:
Stake size of sender 1.034*** (0.000)
Mean genuineness rating of smile 1.514* (0.067) 2.515** (0.035)
Meanperceivedpresence of smiles −0.301 (0.612)
Mean intelligence rating 0.581 (0.568)
Mean trustworthiness −1.818 (0.105)
Mean attractiveness −0.700 (0.357)
Mean self-conﬁdence rating 1.475 (0.113)
Note: p-values in parentheses, * = signiﬁcant at 10%, ** = signiﬁcant at 5%,
*** = signiﬁcant at 1%.rated as genuine. This requires regressing the potential gain on mean
smile genuineness ratings plus other reported characteristics including
the size of the stake (which the sender knows). Here the coefﬁcient on
mean smile rating is around half as large as in the unconditional
regression, and the effect is signiﬁcant at around 4%.
Finally, we investigate whether smiles perceived as genuine are
associated more closely with the amount of money the trustee has
available to offer the sender or with the willingness of the trustee to
behave unselﬁshly. We therefore regress a dummy variable for the
higher stakes treatment on the mean genuineness rating of the smile,
and in a separate equation we regress on the same measure of smile
genuineness a dummy variable indicating that the trustee takes an
unselﬁsh decision (i.e., returns a non-zero amount to the sender). The
purpose is to see whether the rating of the genuineness of the smile is
a reliable signal of the amount available to share, and of the character
of the trustee. As reported in Table 6, smiles rated as genuine are
positively related to both the size of the pie to be shared and the
unselﬁsh behavior by the trustee. Two caveats are in order, however.
First, the coefﬁcient on unselﬁsh behavior by the trustee has a large
standard error, so we cannot be conﬁdent in its measurement, and
thus it is not signiﬁcantly different from zero at conventional levels
(unlike the coefﬁcient on the higher stakes treatment). Moreover, as
we saw in Fig. 2, unselﬁsh behavior itself appears to be inﬂuenced by
the treatment, so we cannot be conﬁdent in treating it as a measure
of the character of the trustee. So we should conclude that smiles
rated as genuine are deﬁnitely informative about high cooperation
opportunities, and may also signal the character of the smiler.
4. Conclusions
Wehave tested a three component hypothesis that smiles perceived
as genuine are an honest signal that has evolved to induce cooperation
in situations requiringmutual trust. All three components are supported
by the evidence. First, senders are more willing to trust those trustees
that are able to produce smiles rated as genuine. Smiles rated as more
genuine are strongpredictors of judgments about the trustworthiness of
trustees, and of the revealedwillingness to send themmoney. Secondly,
higher stake trust games provoke more smiles rated as genuine. This
suggests either that they reﬂect amore positive affective state produced
by thehigher stake, or that they areproducedwhen there are rewards to
any additional effort required. Finally,we show that on average, trusting
those who produce more smiles rated as genuine, will lead to higher
earnings for senders. Trusteeswhowere rated as smilingmore genuinely
return more money on average to senders. It is clearly informative
of the amount the trustee has available to share with the sender; there
is weaker evidence that it may also be a signal of the intrinsic
trustworthiness of the trustee independently of the amount at stake.
Table 6
Character or opportunity?
Dependent variable: Trustee is in higher
stakes treatment
Unselﬁsh behavior
by trustee
(dummy variable) (dummy variable)
Independent variable:
Mean genuineness rating of smile 0.516** (0.038) 0.403 (0.126)
Note: one-tailed p-values in parentheses, standard errors clustered by clip, ** = signiﬁcant
at 5%. Probit equationsestimatedbymaximumlikelihood.Numberof observations =6,720.
Determinants of smile genuineness ratings.
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might have evolved to be honest signals and to be hard to fake. There
might just be some intrinsic correlation between the ability to produce
the signal and the possession of the trait. Alternatively, the signal might
require conspicuous waste (e.g. cost in times of energy or cognitive
effort) or conspicuous precision (e.g. coordination, well-timed and
symmetric activation of eye and cheek muscles). The narrowing of the
visual ﬁeld implied in focusing attention on the person to whom the
smile is directed might also be a form of signaling that the smiler is
willing to forgo other objects of attention.
Indeed, smiling might be interpreted as a form of costly
communication, a hypothesis, that was ﬁrst suggested by Owren
and Bachorowski (2001). It can be shown that the three hypotheses
tested in this paper are in line with three components necessary for
smiling to be a costly signal (Centorrino, Djemai, Hopfensitz, Milinski,
& Seabright, 2014). Concerning the behavior of the smiler and the
target of the smile these components imply that smiling "genuinely"
needs to be:
• causally effective in inducing the target to cooperate with the
smiler, and
• a reliable signal of the likely beneﬁts to the target of cooperating
with the smiler.
Which is in line with our hypotheses H1 and H3.
Under the Owren and Bacharowski hypothesis, it is further
necessary that producing smiles perceived as genuine is costly to
the smiler, involving some degree of cognitive effort for the smiler.
Anecdotal evidence (from job interviews, for example) suggests that
individuals try to “make an effort” to smile convincingly when there is
a good enough reason to do so. We suggest that the test of our
hypothesis H2 is also indirect evidence for such a cost. Speciﬁcally
larger beneﬁts (from larger stakes) make it easier to create smiles
perceived as genuine. However, our evidence cannot distinguish
between the hypotheses that the larger beneﬁts do this by making
individuals more willing to undertake the necessary cognitive cost, or
by simply putting the smiler in a more positive affective state.
The gains from each instance of smiling are not small (around
one dollar and thirty cents in the whole experiment for each increase
of one standard deviation in smile quality). In our experiment as
doubtless in real life, smiling to engage others is an activity in which
we engage many times a day. Our results suggest that the importance
of smiling for building social trust may explain why we engage in this
form of communication that might otherwise seem so pointless.
Supplementary material
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at http://dx.
doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2014.08.001.
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